

O 261609Z SEP 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
CIA WASHDC 0000
NSC WASHDC 0000
NSA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 308460

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL CB US
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS

¶1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.

¶2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES POSTS WITH KEY THEMES TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES REGARDING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 3) AND INFORMATION ON THE NEXT STEPS WE PLAN TO TAKE (SEE PARA 4). TALKING POINTS FOR SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRIES MAY BE FOUND IN PARA 5. ALSO INCLUDED IS PRESS GUIDANCE REGARDING NEXT WEEK'S VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 6). END SUMMARY.

¶3. KEY THEMES TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN DISCUSSING CAMBODIA:

GOALS FOR REGION

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO ENHANCE THE POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. A STABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA WILL SERVE THAT GOAL BY ENDING A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THAILAND AND REMOVING A SOURCE OF REGIONAL TENSION.

SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA INTO THE REGION, IN THE PROCESS REDUCING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AFTER A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, THE CONTINUED STRONG ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABILIZING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, WILL BE WELCOMED IN THE REGION AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR U.S. INTERESTS.

GOALS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT

THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING ACTIVELY THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.

THESE EFFORTS ARE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC APPROACH WITH THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT HAS THREE ASPECTS:

- 1) A VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS;
- 2) PREVENTION OF A RETURN TO DOMINANCE OF THE KHMER ROUGE;
- 3) GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

PARIS CONFERENCE MOMENTUM

ALTHOUGH THE PARIS CONFERENCE DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY BREAKTHROUGHS, MANY SETTLEMENT DETAILS WERE RESOLVED AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. THE CONFERENCE:

- A) CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT. A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS SEEN AS A RECIPE FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE.

B) ACHIEVED A VIRTUAL CONSENSUS THAT THE UN MUST PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY SETTLEMENT PROCESS.

C) ACCOMPLISHED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE WORK ON THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING, GUARANTEES, AND REHABILITATION AND REPATRIATION.

THE CONFERENCE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RESOLVE THE CENTRAL PHNOM PENH REGIME DID NOT ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

ABSENT A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO TURN INCREASINGLY TO MILITARY MEANS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICT, A RESULT WHICH WILL BENEFIT NO ONE EXCEPT PERHAPS THE KHMER ROUGE.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE THE VALUABLE MOMENTUM WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS GENERATED. WE MUST EXPEDITIOUSLY CONSIDER HOW TO OVERCOME VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE AND SUSTAIN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES A NEW INSTITUTIONAL TOOL WE CAN USE IN WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

IN THEIR FINAL STATEMENT, THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, WILL CONTINUE TO FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF ALL PARTIES TO WORK TOWARD THE GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE CO-PRESIDENTS HAVE AGREED TO CONSULT WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS REGARDING THE RECONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS ONLY SUSPENDED.

UNGA RESOLUTION

AT THIS UNGA, WE WILL WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA; WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RESOLUTION ANNUALLY HAS REFLECTED THE OPINION OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY REGARDING THE CAMBODIA SITUATION.

VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL

WE NOTE THAT HANOI HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING FORCES FROM CAMBODIA LATER THIS MONTH. THIS WOULD BE WELCOME SINCE VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE INVASION MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL ONLY ACCEPT VIETNAM'S CLAIM OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL IF THIS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM, AND WE BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THIS MUST BE UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES--AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

VIETNAM HAS ANNOUNCED A TOTAL OF SEVEN WITHDRAWALS DURING THE PAST DECADE, WHICH IN MANY CASES TURNED OUT TO BE TROOP ROTATIONS.

PHNOM PENH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 24,000 VIETNAMESE CADRES AND TROOPS HAVE ALREADY LEFT CAMBODIA DURING JUNE AND JULY 1989; THIS HAS PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM.

THIS MONTH'S WITHDRAWAL WILL APPARENTLY BE VIEWED BY MANY JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO VIETNAM; THERE HAVE BEEN PUBLIC REPORTS, AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY, THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS AUSTRALIA, HAVE DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IN PARIS. THIS HARDLY MEETS THE CRITERIA OF CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL. ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM, PREFERABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND WITH

SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND UNRESTRICTED ABILITY TO VISIT ALL AREAS OF CAMBODIA WOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE ABSENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES.

WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM CAN ONLY OCCUR AFTER A COMPLETE AND VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT RPT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT. THE VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A PRACTICAL REALITY, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

IF TROOPS ARE INDEED WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA, WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE DEMOBILIZED IN VIETNAM.

POSITIONING MAJOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER OR IN LAOS WILL ONLY RAISE FEARS OF VIETNAM'S REINTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA--DESPITE SRV FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S CLAIMS THAT VIETNAM WOULD NEVER RETURN ITS TROOPS TO CAMBODIA.

THACH'S CLAIMS MAY BE CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HUN SEN'S RECENT COMMENTS THAT "IT IS THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE" TO CALL FOR OUTSIDE HELP IF THERE IS OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

POSITIONING VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTHERN LAOS WOULD ALSO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT HANOI'S RESPECT IN GENERAL FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

UNALTERABLE OPPOSITION TO A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER

THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A RETURN TO POWER OF THE MURDEROUS KHMER ROUGE.

A DURABLE SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT MUST BE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH INCORPORATES A SERIES OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE KHMER ROUGE WILL BE CONTAINED.

IN THIS REGARD, WE REGULARLY PRESS ALL THOSE INVOLVED TO CUT BACK THEIR AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE AND OTHERWISE HELP CONTROL THE KR IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SOLUTION.

OUR STRONG PREFERENCE IS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE NOT PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENTS; HOWEVER, ASEAN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE BEST APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE KHMER ROUGE IS THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A STAKE IN A POLITICAL PROCESS, ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS AGAINST THEIR RETURN TO DOMINANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT ANY CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IS DIRECTLY AND INVERSELY RELATED TO THE DEGREE OF KHMER ROUGE PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN IT.

NON-ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL PHNOM PENH REGIME CONTROL

AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEADERS OF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME SHARE THIS UNACCEPTABLE BACKGROUND; MANY ARE FORMER KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS FROM THE EASTERN MILITARY ZONE OF CAMBODIA--INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN, COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER HENG SAMRIN, AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LEADER CHEA SIM.

HUN SEN HAS PROVED HIMSELF TO BE AN ABLE POLITICAL TACTICIAN AND COMPETENT MANIPULATOR OF THE NEWS MEDIA; HOWEVER, WE CAN ASSUME THAT AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND REGIMENTAL DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR HIS MILITARY REGION BEFORE DEFECTING FROM THE KHMER ROUGE TO VIETNAM IN 1977, HUN SEN PARTICIPATED AT A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL IN THE KIND OF MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE MADE THE KHMER ROUGE NAME A BYWORD FOR INFAMY.

THESE FORMER KR OFFICIALS ALSO REPRESENT AN

ILLEGITIMATE REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED FOR THE PAST DECADE BY FOREIGN FORCE OF ARMS; THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IS ALSO ACQUIRING A SIGNIFICANT REPUTATION FOR CORRUPTION.

ONLY A COMPROMISE ON POWER-SHARING BASED ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRINCE SIHANOUK--THE SYMBOL OF TRUE CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM--CAN ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITY WITH LEGITIMACY FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK

THE GOAL OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

WHILE THE CORE OF OUR APPROACH IS A SUSTAINED DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WE BELIEVE THAT STRENGTHENING OUR PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE CAMBODIAN NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE (NCR) WILL ALLOW THE NCR TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT WHICH SERVES THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND PREVENTS A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER.

WE ARE NOT ALONE IN SUPPORTING THE NCR; THE NON-COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ASSISTANCE IN A VARIETY OF FORMS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. OUR EFFORTS ARE IN SUPPORT OF AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE NON-COMMUNISTS AND THESE COUNTRIES.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE NON-LETHAL. WE CANNOT OFFER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE SUPPORT WE AND THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ARE PROVIDING; BECAUSE THIS ASSISTANCE GOES TO GUERRILLA FORCES OPERATING INSIDE CAMBODIA, ANY DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF THESE PROGRAMS COULD BE OF POTENTIAL UTILITY TO THE ADVERSARIES OF THE NCR.

MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PHNOM PENH REGIME

NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR THE NON-COMMUNISTS IS MINOR IN COMPARISON TO THE MASSIVE QUANTITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO PHNOM PENH BY THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER DIRECTLY OR VIA VIETNAM--AN AMOUNT ESTIMATED AT \$1.1 BILLION BETWEEN 1984 AND 1988.

THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS THAT THIS SOVIET ASSISTANCE--A MASSIVE AMOUNT FOR A COUNTRY OF ONLY SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE--HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY THIS YEAR AND IS NOW ESTIMATED TO BE WELL OVER TEN TIMES THE QUANTITY THE CHINESE CURRENTLY PROVIDE THE KHMER ROUGE.

THESE RECENTLY REPORTED INCREASED TRANSFERS OF EQUIPMENT TO THE PHNOM PENH REGIME SUGGEST THAT THE PRK IS MOVING AWAY FROM DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN PREPARATION FOR A RETURN TO THE BATTLEFIELD.

NOT TIME FOR NORMALIZATION WITH VIETNAM

IN LIGHT OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE IN PARIS, THE CURRENT STALEMATE REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND APPARENT MOVEMENT BACKWARDS TOWARD A MILITARY OPTION, NORMALIZATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WOULD BE PREMATURE.

IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC/AID RELATIONSHIPS WITH VIETNAM.

¶4. NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. (THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE FROM A SPEECH BY EAP ASSISTANCE SECRETARY RICHARD SOLOMON IN LOS ANGELES EARLIER THIS MONTH):

THREE PROPOSITIONS

THREE PROPOSITIONS UNDERLIE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO THIS CONTINUING TRAGEDY:

-- FIRST, CAMBODIA IS A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSCIENCE
AND CONCERN OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE DESERVE THEIR OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT -- AND WE WANT TO ENSURE
THAT THERE ARE NO MORE CAMBODIAN KILLING FIELDS. THE
UNITED STATES WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUIT OF
THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WE
HAVE NEITHER THE POLITICAL POSITION NOR THE RESOURCES
TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES ON OUR OWN.

-- SECOND, OUR PRIMARY SECURITY OBLIGATION IN THIS
REGION IS TO THAILAND, TO WHICH WE ARE LEGALLY BOUND BY
THE MANILA PACT OF 1954. AS WELL, WE HAVE A MAJOR
INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF
ASEAN.

-- AND THIRD, WE HAVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IN SEEING
INDOCHINA FREED OF THE RIVALRIES OF THE GREAT POWERS --
AN OBJECTIVE MOST LIKELY REALIZED IF CAMBODIAN AND
VIETNAM ARE AT PEACE WITHIN THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR
NEIGHBORS.

THREE ACTIVITIES

GIVEN THESE PROPOSITIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL
PURSUE THREE LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD,
ALL DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM OF
PARIS:

-- WE WILL SUSTAIN ACTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE FIVE
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. FRANCE,
CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE MAJOR POWERS WITH
THE MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA AND
VIETNAM.

THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF VIETNAM
AND HUN SEN, MUST RESTRICT ITS INCREASING FLOW OF ARMS
INTO CAMBODIA, AND BRING HANOI TO SEE THAT ITS OWN
INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY ANOTHER CYCLE OF
WARFARE IN INDOCHINA -- WHICH CERTAINLY WILL BE THE
CASE IF IT SEEKS FULL POWER FOR HUN SEN IN THE ABSENCE
OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

IN RETURN, HANOI AND HUN SEN -- AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY -- HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT CHINA TO EQUALLY
RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.
INDEED, BEIJING HAS AN OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACTIVE
MEASURES THAT WILL PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM AGAIN
IMPOSING A MURDEROUS RULE ON THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, IS DUE CREDIT FOR TAKING THE
DIPLOMATIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO HELP THE
CAMBODIAN FACTIONS BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES. WE SHOULD
POINT OUT THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS ONLY SUSPENDED,
NOT ADJOURNED -- SO THAT FRANCE AND CONFERENCE
CO-CHAIRMAN INDONESIA HAVE A CONTINUING MANDATE TO WORK
FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

-- AT A SECOND LEVEL, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT. THEIR
SECURITY INTERESTS ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA; AND WE WILL SUPPORT
THEIR EFFORTS -- MOST IMMEDIATELY AT THE UPCOMING
SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

-- AND FINALLY, WE WILL SUSTAIN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE
NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND PRINCE SIHANOUK AS THE
POLITICAL CENTER OF A PROCESS OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION.

SOME NOW ARGUE THAT THE THREAT OF A KHMER ROUGE
RESURGENCE IS SUCH THAT THE U.S. MUST RELY ON HUN SEN

RATHER THAN PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THIS APPROACH IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED ON SEVERAL COUNTS.

FIRST, A REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED BY FOREIGN FORCE OF ARMS LACKS LEGITIMACY. VIOLATING THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTEGRITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND BE TO OUR PERIL IN MANY OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. SECOND, THERE IS AT PRESENT LITTLE BASIS FOR ASSUMING THAT HUN SEN'S UNPROVEN FORCES, ABSENT THEIR VIETNAMESE PROTECTORS, CAN ELIMINATE THE KHMER ROUGE, A GOAL THAT ELUDED HANOI'S VAUNTED ARMY FOR THE PAST DECADE. AND LASTLY, IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SUPPORTED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, SUCH A MOVE WOULD PIT THE U.S. AGAINST CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM -- A POLICY HARDLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS DEMOCRATS (WITH A SMALL "D"), OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE TO A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PERMITS NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. WE SEE PRESS REPORTS OF HUN SEN'S POPULARITY, OF REFORMIST POLICIES PROMOTED BY PHNOM PENH THAT ARE RESTORING BUDDHISM AND ALLOWING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE MARKET ACTIVITY. IF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IS AS POPULAR AS ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN PORTRAYS IT TO BE, IT CAN ONLY BENEFIT BY TAKING ITS CASE TO THE PEOPLE IN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE UN.

THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF SUCH A CREDIBLE TEST OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SUPPORTING A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA THAT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO DOMINANCE.

THUS, THE ISSUE COMES BACK TO WHETHER THE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS, ENCOURAGED BY THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORTERS, CAN JOIN TOGETHER IN A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE U.S. WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO MOVE EVENTS IN THIS DIRECTION. CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST DO THE SAME. MOSCOW, IN PARTICULAR, MUST ACCEPT AND ACT ON THE REALITY THAT WITHOUT SOME WILLINGNESS BY VIETNAM AND HUN SEN TO COMPROMISE ON POWER-SHARING, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, NO RESPITE FROM ARMED CONFLICT.

15. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS FOR SELECTED HOST GOVERNMENTS:

AUSTRALIA

WE APPRECIATE THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE, MOST RECENTLY AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

WE BOTH AGREE THAT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER ARE VITAL. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE KEY TO CONTROLLING THE KHMER ROUGE IS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUILT AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

WE APPRECIATED YOUR INFORMING THE VIETNAMESE AT THE END OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE THAT FAILURE TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN THAT AUSTRALIA WILL CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING OFFICIAL AID TO THE SRV.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.

WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS

TO THE FUND.

BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND

WE WANT TO AGAIN THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION THAT OUR DELEGATIONS ENJOYED THROUGHOUT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS.

THE CONFERENCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY TO ANY SETTLEMENT IS THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING: HOW TO CONSTRUCT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, OF COURSE, WAS THE TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE WHICH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ADOPTED ON THIS ISSUE. THIS UNCOMPROMISING STANCE WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE MANNER IN WHICH PRINCE SIHANOUK APPROACHED THE PROBLEM.

AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE OUTLINE FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN STATES PRODUCED AT THE VERY END OF THE CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE THAT THIS PROBLEM BASICALLY MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES, EFFORTS BY OTHERS CAN BE HELPFUL IN PROVIDING USEFUL NEW APPROACHES.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. IT IS VITAL FOR ASEAN TO CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. WORKING RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING THE DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN AT THIS YEAR'S UNGA TO ENSURE STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR CAMBODIA RESOLUTION.

WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.

CANADA

WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION OUR TWO DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD

UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.

CHINA

WE WANT TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION THAT EXISTED IN PARIS BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE. THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY, WE FEAR, WILL BE A PERIOD OF CIVIL WARFARE. SHOULD THE KHMER ROUGE BEGIN TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THIS WILL RISK SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TWO NON-COMMUNIST FACTIONS WITH WHICH THE KHMER ROUGE IS AFFILIATED.

YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE NEED FOR CONTROLS TO ASSURE THAT THEY DO NOT RETURN TO POWER IN CAMBODIA. WE WERE VERY INTERESTED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY YOUR DELEGATION IN PARIS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE'S ROLE IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE LESS THAN THE OTHER FACTIONS.

WE ARE CONTINUING TO URGE THE SOVIETS TO PUSH THE VIETNAMESE AND HUN SEN TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE TRANSITIONAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.

TO AVERT AN ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, WE ARE ASKING THE SOVIETS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO ITS CAMBODIAN ALLY. SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD ALSO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA OF SENIOR KHMER ROUGE LEADERS LIKE POL POT, IENG SARY AND TA MOK IS PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT, IF YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THESE UNACCEPTABLE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS TO RELOCATE TO CHINA.

FRANCE

WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR ALL OF THE HARD WORK THAT YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF, ESPECIALLY CLAUDE MARTIN, DEVOTED TOWARD MAKING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA A SUCCESS.

ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND.

WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD UPON THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ACHIEVED AT THE CONFERENCE.

INDONESIA

WE WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR YOUR IMPRESSIVE EFFORTS, ALONG WITH THOSE OF OUR FRENCH FRIENDS, TO ORGANIZE AND GUIDE THE MONTH-LONG PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRE THE DEDICATION

AND COURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DISPLAYED IN UNDERTAKING--DESPITE DAUNTING ODDS--THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE TO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE TRAGIC CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS.

AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE OUTLINE FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN DELEGATIONS WERE DISCUSSING AT THE VERY END OF THE CONFERENCE. IT MAY CONTAIN ELEMENTS YOU WOULD FIND USEFUL IN ATTEMPTING, UNDER YOUR MANDATE FROM THE CONFERENCE, TO REVIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE CAMBODIANS AND OTHER INVOLVED STATES ON THIS KEY ISSUE.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. OF COURSE, CONTINUED ASEAN LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS VITAL. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.

JAPAN

WE APPRECIATE THE SOLIDARITY THAT JAPAN HAS SHOWN WITH US ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE AND THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

THE CHIEF IMPASSE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART, A POSITION EACH OF US SHARES.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO

HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND. WE APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S STEADFAST SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE.

WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT. AT THIS UNGA, WE ALSO NEED TO WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA.

MALAYSIA

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRED THE ACTIVE ROLE YOUR COUNTRY PLAYED AT THE MEETING, PARTICULARLY IN THE TAXING JOB OF CO-CHAIRING THE COMMITTEE ON GUARANTEES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE

CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR ASEAN TO CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. WORKING RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING THE DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEW ZEALAND

WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL TO A UN-ADMINISTERED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM/PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. HOPEFULLY, FURTHER NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL MAKE THIS A REALITY.

PHILIPPINES

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

SINGAPORE

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

SOVIET UNION

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE PARIS CONFERENCE. WE EXPECT THAT IN KEEPING WITH THE CLOSING STATEMENT, CONFERENCE CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, WILL SOON BEGIN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES WITH A VIEW TOWARD REENERGIZING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CORE POWER-SHARING ISSUE.

TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, UNLESS HANOI AND PHNOM PENH CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, WE ARE AFRAID THAT ESCALATING VIOLENCE WILL SOON ADD TO THE MISFORTUNES OF THE LONG-SUFFERING CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

INCREASING INSTABILITY IN CAMBODIA WILL ALSO HAVE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS. IT WILL REFLECT BADLY ON OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INEVITABLY PROMOTE STRAINS IN OUR BILATERAL TIES.

WE PLAN TO WORK WITH OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER ALLIES IN THE REGION TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED IN A COSTLY MILITARY TEST OF STRENGTH AND TO ENCOURAGE A QUICK RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN REDOUBLED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROLONGED REGIONAL CONFLICT. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO CURTAIL AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE FLOW OF ARMS INTO CAMBODIA.

TO MOVE THIS POLITICAL PROCESS FORWARD, WE WOULD EXPECT YOU TO USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH BOTH HANOI AND PHNOM PENH TO CONVINCE THEM THAT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON AN INTERIM CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT LED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK AND INCLUDING EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION FOR THE NON-COMMUNISTS AS WELL AS THE HUN SEN FACTION IS ESSENTIAL. IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO AVERT A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND TO FORESTALL THE LOOMING SPECTER OF A KHMER ROUGE RETURN

TO POWER.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A KR RETURN TO POWER IN CAMBODIA AND STRONGLY PREFER THAT THEY HAVE NO ROLE IN ANY CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.

WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT BEIJING DID NOT SUPPORT AN EQUAL ROLE FOR THE KHMER ROUGE IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS OPENING SHOULD BE EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE ANY ROLE FOR THE KR. WE HOPE THAT YOU CAN PERSUADE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH TO PURSUE THIS OPPORTUNITY.

SWEDEN

YOUR EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US IN WASHINGTON THAT YOU HAVE DECLINED THE SRV AND PRK INVITATION TO MONITOR THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, STATING THAT YOU WOULD ONLY PARTICIPATE IF ALL PARTIES WERE AGREED AND IF THERE WERE A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE.

WE APPRECIATE THE POSITION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE.

THAILAND

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

UNITED KINGDOM

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR TWO DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE THE COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT WHICH WE BOTH SOUGHT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PARTS.

¶6. THE FOLLOWING EAP PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA WAS PREPARED SEPTEMBER 21, 1989:

Q: THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOW WITHDRAWN THEIR TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA. WHAT'S OUR REACTION?

A: WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN INTERNATIONALLY-VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL, PREFERABLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, WE WELCOME HANOI'S APPARENT PULL-OUT AS AN END TO ITS TEN-YEAR OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. WE NOTE THAT THIS HAS BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE INVASION. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM CANNOT EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ACHIEVE IN CAMBODIA A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

Q: WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL HAVE ON OUR CAMBODIAN POLICY?

A: THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, UNFORTUNATELY, DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE OF FINALIZING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT. TO A LARGE EXTENT, IT WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING WHICH PRECLUDED A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT THE

CONFERENCE'S INITIAL SESSION.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED POLITICALLY AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE, THEREFORE, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE CONFERENCE CO-PRESIDENTS AND PARTICIPANTS IN BUILDING UPON THE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD A RESOLUTION.

Q: NOW THAT VIETNAM HAS PULLED ITS TROOPS OUT OF CAMBODIA AS WE DEMANDED, ARE WE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH HANOI AS WE AGREED?

IA. WE AGREED TO JOIN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA WITH THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRAGIC CAMBODIAN CONFLICT INCLUDING A VERIFIED TOTAL VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, ASSURANCES AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE KHMER ROUGE, AND A PROCESS LEADING TO REAL SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

IF THE CONFERENCE HAD ACHIEVED THAT OBJECTIVE, WE WERE PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI, AS WE HAVE STATED MANY TIMES. THE VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A PRACTICAL REALITY, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE REACHED AN IMPASSE ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING -- TO A LARGE EXTENT DUE TO THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME. THEY REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK, WHICH WOULD LEAD THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THEY CLEARLY INTEND THAT THE PRK SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF POWER UNTIL ELECTIONS. WE, AND MOST OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE, ARE CONVINCED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SIGNS OF INCREASING DELIVERIES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE PHNOM PENH REGIME AND THE IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY HAVE FOR AN ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE.

IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI WOULD BE PREMATURE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH VIETNAM, HANOI CAN BE CONVINCED TO ADOPT A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.

EAGLEBURGER